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P r e f a c e  
Theprob lem o f h o w t o  make a  "fair division" 
ofresourcesbetweencompetinginterests a r i s e s i n  
many a r e a s  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  a t  IIASA. One o f  t h e  
t a s k s  i n  t h e  S y s t e m a n d D e c i s i o n  S c i e n c e s A r e a  i s  
t h e  s y s t e m a t i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  
o f  f a i r n e s s  and t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  
p r o c e d u r e s  s a t i s f y i n g  them. 
A p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m o f  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  h a v i n g  
wide a p p l i c a t i o n  i n g o v e r n m e n t a l  dec i s ion -mak ing  
i s  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  appor t ionmen t  problem.  An 
a p p l i c a t i o n a r i s e s i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e o v e r h o w  
many s e a t s i n t h e ~ u r o ~ e a n P a r l i a m e n t  t o  a l l o c a t e  
t o  - t h e  d i f f e r e n t  member c o u n t r i e s .  C u r r e n t  
d i s c u s s i o n s  s w i r l  around p a r t i c u l a r  numbers,  o v e r  
which agreement  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c h i e v e .  A 
s y s t e m a t i c  app roach  t h a t  s e e k s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
agreement  o n - t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  
i n v o l v e d  s h o u l d  s t a n d  a  b e t t e r  chance  of  a c c e p t -  
a n c e  i n  t h a t  it r e p r e s e n t s  a  s c i e n t i f i c  o r  sys t em 
a n a l y t i c  app roach  t o  t h e  problem.  

A b s t r a c t  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  c e r t a i n n a t u r a l  a n d d e s i r a b l e  
p r o p e r t i e s  f o r  appor t ionmen t  a r e  f o r m u l a t e d ,  and 
it i s  shown t h a t  t h e y  l e a d  t o a u n i q u e  p r o c e d u r e  
f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  s o l u t i o n s .  T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  t h e n  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f t h e  European P a r l i a m e n t .  

A PROBLEM OF FAIR DIVISION: 
APPORTIONING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The mass media and, ipso facto, the declarations of 
-- 
political leaders of several of the nine countries of the 
EEC point to a major current problem, apportionment: how 
are the seats in the EuropeanParliament to bedistributed 
among the member nations? Several plans have beenadvanced. 
The " D r a f t "  p l a n  ' )  as revised apportions 359 seats, an 
alternate F r e n c h  p r o p o s a l 2 )  is based on 291 seats, and an- 
other I r i s h  p l a n 2 )  suggests 388 seats. The discussion, if 
abstracted from its universal suffrage and direct election 
aspects, swirls around numbers, the need toassure the small 
nations a voice which can be heard,and yet the fundamental 
desire that the Parliament should be genuinely representative 
of the demographic distribution which exists today. 
To students of the history of the United States the 
preoccupations and arguments have a decidedly familiarring. 
A considerable investment of time and thought was given to 
the apportionment question at the Constitutional Convention 
in ~hiladel~hia in 1787. Attended by the political and 
intellectual leaders of the American colonies, the philo- 
sophical children of the European 18th Century enlightment, 
this Convention sought to give legal definitions to the 
ideals of individual freedoms and equality among men. The 
E l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  European Par l iament  by D i r e c t  Universa l  S u f f r a g e ,  
Dra f t  Convention wi th  Explanatory S ta tement ,  S p e c i a l  I s s u e  based on PATIJN 
r e p o r t  ( D O C .  368/74) ,  ( ~ e s o l u t i o n  adopted 1 4  January  1 9 7 5 ) .  
2 ,  As r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  p r e s s .  
commonly held philosophical principle that, as James Madison 
stated it, 3, the states "ought to vote in the same propor- 
tion in which their citizens would do if the people of all 
the states were collectively met," was checked only by the 
fear of the small states "solicitous to guard . . .  against an 
improper consolidation" of a league of large states. From 
this emerged, on the one hand, the language of Article I, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, "Representatives and 
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states 
which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective numbers;" and, on the other hand, a Senate, with 
each state accorded two seats. 
But, exactly - how the proportional representation was 
to be made was left open. This led to controversies every 
ten years (i.e., at each new census) about how the phrase 
"according to their respective numbers" should be inter- 
preted. Endless discussions ensued in which rival regional 
and party factions suggested multitudes of alternate ways 
of apportioning (naturally, each faction suggesting plans 
to its peculiar advantage). In the end such discussions 
were doomed to lead to ad hoc results and more jockeying 
--
over numbers while insufficient attention was being paid 
to the basic principles of fair division. Thomas Jefferson, 4 1 
in recommending that George Washington veto one of these 
apportionment bills, clearly saw the issue: "[The bill] 
seems to have avoided establishing ... a rule, lest it might 
not suit on another occasion. Perhaps it may be found next 
time more convenient to distribute them among the smaller 
states; at another time among the larger states; at other 
times according to any other crochet which ingenuity may 
invent and the combinations of the day give strength to 
carry. " 
3 
Wri t ings  o f  James Madison, v o l .  I I 1 , E d .  G a i l l a r d  Hunt,G.P.  Putnam, 
New York, 1902, p. 385. 
4, The Works o f  Thomas J e f f e r s o n ,  v o l .  V I ,  Ed. Pau l  L .  Ford,  
G.P.Putnam&Sons,  New York, 1904, p. 469. 
Discussions should not revolve about the rival merits 
of one numerical solution over another. The issue is rather 
to decide upon a rule or method which is "fair," i.e., whose 
qualitative properties satisfy principles acceptable to cit- 
izen and politician alike, and which provides quantitative 
solutions for any desired size of Parliament. Statesmen 
should reach agreement on principles; the principles must 
then, through computation, determine apportionments for 
whatever size elective body is sought. This procedure is 
possible scientifically. Moreover it may be recommended 
on political grounds because agreements in principle are 
usually more readily reached than agreements on numbers. 
The "Congressional Record" of the U.S. bears witness to 
the interminable discussions which followed each census 
and the heated tempers over the numbers to be apportioned 
in the House of Representatives. Europe today bears wit- 
ness to the difficulties of numbers as proposed in at least 
three " p Z a n s . "  Numbers are pernicious: they invite, or 
at least allow, endless manipulation and horse trading; 
whereas properties of methods or principles of fairness 
merge the divergences on numbers into agreement on method. 
It is as a U. S. Representative said in 1900 : ) "The appor- 
tionment of Representatives to the population is a mathe- 
matical problem. Then why not use a method that will stand 
the test... ? 
5 
Representative E.W. Gibson, Congressional Record, vol. 70, 
70th Congress, 2nd Session, 1929, p. 1500. 
BASIC PRINCIPLES A N D  THE EEC PLAN 
In the " D r a f t  C o n v e n t i o n  w i t h  E x p Z a n a t o r y  S t a t e m e n t t t  
entitled Elections to the European Parliament by Direct 
Universal Suffrage cited above (hereafter referred to as the 
EEC Draft), certain criteria are presented which it is desired 
that an apportionment method should satisfy. The first and 
most significant of these criteria is the following general 
" f a i r n e s s "  principle: 
(i) " t h e  h i g h e s t  d e g r e e  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  
s h o u l d  b e  a c h i e v e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  i n h a b -  
i t a n t s  o f  a S t a t e  a n d  t h e  number  o f  i t s  r e p r e -  
s e n t a t i v e s  i n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t . "  
This fundamental principle underlies what is in fact 
meant by the very notion of apportionment--namely, an 
assignment of representatives to the several states pro- 
portionately according to their size. According to 
Webster, "To apportion is to distribute by right measure, 
to set off in just parts, to assign in due and proper 
proportion. "6) The same principle underlies the United 
States Constitutional mandate on apportionment, "repre- 
sentatives shall be apportioned ... according to their 
respective numbers." 
Having adopted this basic proportionality principle, 
however, the EEC Draft goes on to enunciate two other 
criteria that have a more distinctly political character, 
and which (it will be seen) are at odds with the above- 
mentioned principle. Thus the second desired criterion 
for an apportionment is 
(ii) " a l l  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  o f  a S t a t e  
s h o u l d  be r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t . ' '  
This criterion in effect imposes a minimum required 
number of representatives for each member country depending 
on the number of its political parties --a number which of 
6 ) 
The Wri t ings  and Speeches of Daniel  Webster, v o l .  V I ,  National  
E d i t i o n ,  L i t t l e , B r o w n  & C o n ,  Boston, Mass., 1903, p. 107.  
course may change substantially from time to time. The 
third criterion mentioned in the EEC Draft is of similar 
nature, 
(iii) "the new distribution of seats should not 
lead to a reduction in the present number of any 
State's representatives . "  
In fact, the present apportionment gives enough seats 
to every country so that the third requirement alone implies 
that the second will in practice almost certainly be satis- 
fied. However, unless the number of delegates is to be 
vastly enlarged, it is evident that the third requirement 
is quite incompatible with the first. Indeed, Luxembourg, 
with a present population of 357,000, has less than 2/10 
of one percent of the total population of the nine EEC 
countries, and it also has six seats. Thus if in a new 
apportionment Luxembourg is to receive at least six seats 
and have a number of representatives proportional to its 
-
population, it will be seen that the total number of seats 
would have to be upwards of 3,000--not an altogether 
reasonable number. Even granting that Luxembourg's position 
is somewhat special, Ireland presently has ten seats and 
only 1.2 percent of the population, so that one would have 
to have over 750 seats for Ireland to be represented pro- 
portionately with the other countries. 
Thus it must be recognized that, barring unreasonably 
large sizes of the Parliament, strict proportionality of 
representation cannot be achieved in the presence of criteria 
(ii) and (iii). Precisely the same issue arose in the debates 
at the United States Constitutional Convention in 1787. 
Governor Morris of New York noted that if representatives 
were apportioned proportionally to population, "it would 
exclude some states altogether ... who would not have a 
sufficient number to entitle them to a single representative. " 7, 
7 
Writings of James Madison, Ed. Gaillard Hunt, G.P. Putnam, 
New York, 1902. 
The solution was to make an exception to the proportionality 
principle in this one case; thus the U.S. Constitutional 
----
requirement "but each State shall have at least one Repre- 
sentative." 
Granted that some degree of representation must be 
afforded to every member country, the objective must always 
be to obtain an apportionment that is proportional to popu- 
lation p as closely -- as is possible, subject to the requirement 
of minimum representation. In the U.S. case this point of 
view was aptly summed up by Webster in 1832 as follows, "Of 
representation there can be nothing less than one represent- 
ative ... it is quite obvious, therefore, that the apportion- 
ment of representative power can never be precise and perfect ... 
the Constitution, therefore, must be understood . . .  as requiring 
of Congress to make the apportionment of representatives among 
the several states according to their respective numbers - as
near as may be."') 
----
It seems evident from even a casual inspection of the 
apportionment proposed in the EEC Draft that this principle 
of allocating seats to states proportionally to population 
as near as may be, has not been adhered to. Indeed, one may 
-----
compute the precise proportion of the total population that 
each country has, and hence the precise number of represent- 
atives (including fractions) that each country would ideally 
be entitled to. This number is called the exact quota for 
that country. The populations, exact quotas, and currently 
proposed EEC apportionment are shown in T a b l e  1. 
(Population figures are the numbers used in the revised EEC 
Draft. ) 
8 
Ibid, Webster, pp. 107-108. 
1 FRG 
Exact 
Quota 1 86. O l C  
Pop. 
(000's) 
EEC 
Apphent 1 72 
62,041 
I t a l y  France Neth. I I 
T A B L E  
In a perfect apportionment, every country would 
Belg. 
9,772 
13.547 
2 3 
receive its exact quota, and indeed should receive its 
exact quota if (in an unlikely event) this turns out to 
be a whole number. But we cannot expect that the exact 
DK 
5,052 
7.004 
17 
quota will ever, in practice, turn out to be integer; 
hence, as fractional representatives are not to be coun- 
tenanced, it is necessary to "round" the exact quotas 
either up or down in such a way that the total number of 
representatives apportioned is the prescribed number. 
I R  
3,086 
4.278 
1 3  
But it will be seen from T a b l e  I that the proposed appor- 
tionments are nowhere near the exact quotas; even taking 
Lux. 
357 
0.495 
6 
into account the desire for certain minimum levels of 
representation, this could not be said to be an apportion- 
Tota l  
258,955 
3 5 9 
359 
ment to population as near as may be. In particular, 
-----
therefore, the propos'ed apportionment is not at all 
compatible with the first and foremost principle of 
proportionality enunciated by the EEC Parliament under 
(i) above. 
To appreciate the inequities that result from an 
apportionment that deviates from the proportionality or 
quota principle, one need only consider the implied 
disparities between countries in the number - of persons 
that each delegate has to represent. For, as the delegates 
-- --
in the newly apportioned Parliament are to be directly 
elected by specific constituencies, it is relevant to ask 
how large these constituencies will be. Put differently, 
to what extent will citizens of different countries have 
unequal shares in their representatives? In Luxembourg, 
with a population of 357,000 there would be six seats, 
hence on the average each delegate would have to represent 
59,500 persons, while in Ireland each delegate would have 
to represent on the average 237,385 persons (about four 
times as many), in the Netherlands each would have to 
represent on the average 498,148 (over eight times as 
many) and in the F.R.G. each would have to represent on 
the average 861,681 persons (over fourteen times as many 
as in Luxembourg) . 
The fundamental fairness principle that any acceptable 
apportionment method must be based on is the principle of 
proportionality. The EEC apportionment is quite evidently 
not based on proportionality and hence, although it is 
found by a procedure, the procedure lacks justification. 
Let us now consider what the implications of the proportion- 
ality principle are for an acceptable apportionment method. 
For given populations of countries and a given number 
of seats to be apportioned, we begin by computing the exact 
quota for each country, that is, the precise number of 
representatives out of the total to which each country is 
entitled. Any reasonable apportionment method must begin 
with the exact quotas; in the absence of any requirements 
concerning the minimum allowable number of seats, the problem 
then reduces to deciding which countries are to have their 
exact quota rounded up, and which are to be rounded down. 
Any apportionment method that operates in this way will 
be said to satisfy quota. But this rounding cannot, in 
general, be achieved by the "usual" method of rounding 
fractions of less than .5 down, and .5 or more up. The 
reason is seen from the example of T a b l e  I :  the "usual" 
rounding of the exact quotas would yield the apportionment: 
T A B L E  2 
T h e  Usual R o u n d i n g  
But the sum of these numbers is 360 whereas we are required 
to apportion 359 seats. 
FRG 
86 
H A M I L T O N ' S  METHOD AND T H E  ALABAMA PARADOX 
I R 
4 
A second reasonable approach that suggests itself is 
Lux .  
o 
UK 
78 
the following. Given the exact quotas, first give each 
country as many whole number seats as it is entitled to; 
this leaves a certain number of seats still to be distrib- 
I t a l y  
77 
uted. These remaining seats are given, one each, to those 
countries having the largest decimal fractions in their 
exact quota. This method was first proposed by Alexander 
Hamilton, first Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, in 1792, 
France 
7 5 
and it is consequently known as Hamilton's method. In the 
European literature this same method is known as "la 
repartition au plus fort reste." 
Neth. 
19  
The solution by Hamilton's method for 359 seats is 
shown in T a b l e  3. 
9 I 
The Papers  of Alexander Hamilton, v o l .  X I  ( ~ e b .  1792 - J u n e 1 7 9 2 ) ,  
Ed. Harold C.  S y r e t t ,  Coluinbia U n i v e r s i t y  Press,New York, 1 9 6 6 , p p .  228-230. 
Belg. 
1 4  
DK 
7 
T A B L E  3  
Hamilton ' s  S o l u t i o n  f o r  359 S e a t s  
Hamilton's method (or variants of it) was used in the 
U.S. from 1850  to 1900 .  But in 1 8 8 1  a most serious diffi- 
culty with this method came to light. C.W. Seaton, Chief 
Clerk of the United States Census Office related that while 
making calculations by Hamilton's method for various sizes 
of Congress (and fixed populations), he discovered that 
whereas in a house of 299 members Alabama was entitled to 
eight seats, when the house was increased to 300  members 
Alabama was entitled to only seven. l o )  This absurd phenomenon 
was dubbed by Seaton the "Alabama paradox." It was immedi- 
ately recognized as being inherently unfair and absurd as 
a property of any apportionment method, and from 1 9 0 1  on 
the Hamilton method was abandoned. That the Alabama paradox 
was no mere quirk of the Hamilton method, but is frequently 
encountered may be seen from EEC example: for a Parliament 
of 358 members, the Hamilton method gives Luxembourg one 
seat (see T a b l e  4) whereas in a Parliament of 3 5 9  members 
it would get none (see T a b l e  3). 
FRG 
8 6 
Italy 
77 
UK 
7 8 
T A B L E  4 
Hamil ton 's  S o l u t i o n  f o r  358 S e a t s  
Exac"5. 
Quota 
Hamilton 
Solution 
1 0 )  
Apportionment Among the Several States, House of Representatives, 
56th Congress, 2nd Session, Report 2130, 20 December 1900, p. 18. 
France 
7 5 
FR G 
770 
86 
Belg. 
13 
Neth. 
19 
UK 
77.496 
7 7 
DK 
7 
Italy 
76.535 
7 7 
I R 
4 
Lux. 
0 
France 
74.350 
74 
Neth. 
18.594 
19 
Belg. 
13.510 
14 
DK 
6.984 
7 
IR 
4.266 
4 
Lux. 
0.494 
0 
Thus the Hamilton method also turns out to be 
unacceptable, and we are left with the problem of 
both satisfying quota and avoiding the Alabama 
paradox. 
THE QUOTA METHOD: PRINCIPLES 
Three principles emerge which are essential to any 
method of apportionment of representation in a union of 
sovereign States. 
(1) A method must be universally applicable, 
that is, must provide solutions for all sizes 
of Parliament sufficiently large to satisfy 
minimum representational requirements, and all 
possible demographic distributions and numbers 
of countries. 
(2) A method must satisfy quota, insofar as 
this is possible in view of assuring small 
countries the minimum required representation. 
(3) A method must avoid the Alabama paradox. 
In the presence of minimum representational require- 
ments the notion of quota must be extended. Consider, 
for example, the case where each country of the EEC were 
required to have at least six seats but that sixty seats 
were available, then, in particular, the F.R.G. would have 
an "exact quota" of 14.37 but they can clearly never receive 
as many as fourteen seats. The applicable exact quota 
concept in such cases is easily obtained. If, for a certain 
size of Parliament, the exact quota of some country is less 
than the minimum mandated required representation, then this 
country should receive its minimum number of seats and then 
be considered as eliminated from the problem of apportionment. 
This leaves fewer countries and fewer seats to be distributed 
among them and one can now define the essential property of 
satisfying quota for this altered situation in the natural 
way. So, in the presence of minimum requirements, satisfying 
quota has this meaning. 
But - how should minimum requirements be determined? 
A natural approach is to say that each country should 
receive a certain fixed minimum of seats, such as each 
department in France has at least two deput6s and each 
state in the U.S. has at least one Representative. How- 
ever, perhaps the political reality calls for minima 
which are different. In this case only one limitation 
is imposed on the choice of minima: no large country 
should be overrepresented in comparison with a smaller 
country at the minima. Or, to put it another way, the 
assignment of minimum representations must not favor the 
large countries over the small countries. The device of 
minima is resorted to as a means of assuring power to 
small countries beyond what their populations would 
naturally assign them. 
If the three essential properties are to be satisfied, 
and if the minimum required representations do not favor 
larger in comparison with smaller countries then it is a 
scientific fact that there is one mathematically consistent 
method and only one method which can be used. This method 
is known as the Quota Method. "),12) Said in another way, 
the Quota method is the only mathematically consistent 
-- --- 
method which -- can satisfy the three principles. In political 
-- 
terms, if agreement can be reached on these three natural 
properties then the numerical solutions are determined. 
This, it must be underlined, is a strong mathematical 
statement which requires a careful and complex argument. 
But it allows the political discussion to dispense with the 
numbers and step up to the choice of principles. 
1') 
M.L. Balinski and H.P.Young,  he Quota Method of Apportionment," 
American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 82, 1975, pp. 701-730. 
")M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young, "A New Method for Congressional 
Apportionment," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A., 
vol. 71, 1974, pp. 4602-4606. 
THE QUOTA METHOD: MECHANICS 
To obtain solutions the following data must be spec- 
ified: the population of each country, the size of the 
European Parliament to be apportioned, and the minimum 
number of seats to be accorded each country. 
The mechanics are relatively straightforward. First, 
each country is accorded the minimum number of seats which 
it is required to have. Then, given the apportionment for 
a Parliament having any given number of seats (e.g., as 
given by the initial minimum requirement solution) the 
apportionment for a Parliament having one more seat is 
determined by singling out that country which should re- 
ceive the extra seat. This country is the one which 
would have the largest average district size in the larger 
Parliament provided that its number of seats does not round 
its exact quota up by more than one. 
The method is natural in its construction for it 
seeks to assign the extra seat to that country still least 
represented in the new Parliament. Despite the simplicity 
of this construction it is both a surprising and a non- 
obvious mathematical fact that no other construction will 
satisfy the three basic properties. 
THE QUOTA METHOD: SELECTED SOLUTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
In the current situation the populations are fixed, 
but minima have not been explicitly stated. Two criteria 
which concern this decision were stated in the EEC Draft, 
namely, criterion (ii) which assures each country as many 
seats as "political forces" within it and criterion (iii) 
which assures each country as many seats as in the present 
European Parliament. In the present situation criterion 
(iii) dominates (ii) and hence would appear to imply that 
the minimum number of seats should be 
T A B L E  5 
Present Minima 
On the other hand, the existence of alternate plans implies 
the possibility of setting different minima. 
FRG 
3 6 
A second decision to be made is the total number of 
seats in the Parliament. The current proposal suggests 
355, but this number is not predetermined; rather, it is 
the result of an ad hoc procedure. 
France 
3 6 
Below, solutions are given for several choices of 
minimum requirements and several choices for the size of 
Parliament. These are given as interesting examples and 
for comparison with the various proposed plans. They 
also illustrate the numerical solutions which are produced. 
But, of course, solutions can be found for any choices of 
minima and Parliament size. The sizes have been taken as 
291 (French Plan), 359 (European Parliament Plan), 388 
(Irish Plan) and 425 (a larger alternative). For each 
such total size the method has been applied with a common 
minimum representation of 1, a common minimum of 3, a 
common minimum of 6, and minima corresponding to the present 
number of seats (as given in Table 5). It should not be for- 
gotten that each quota method solution is the only solution 
for the given data and choice of minima that can result 
from the agreement to accept the three principles that have 
been stated. 
UK 
36 
Neth. 
1 4  
I t a l y  
3 6 
Belg.  
1 4  
DK 
10 
I R 
10 
Lux. 
6 
"FRENCH PLAN"  P a r l i a m e n t  S i z e  2 9 1  
"EUROPEAN P A R L I A M E N T  PLAN"  P a r l i a m e n t  S i z e  3 5 9  
" I R I S H  P L A N N  P a r l i a m e n t  S i z e  3 8 8  
'ANOTHER A L T E R N A T I V E r  P a r l i a m e n t  S i z e  4 2 5  
The Quota Method has a tendency of producing solu- 
tions which round up the exact quotas of large countries 
more often than those of small countries. This, as has 
been said, is unavoidable once the three essential prin- 
ciples are adopted. Moreover, as the minimum requirements 
give an increasingly large disproportionate representation 
to the smaller countries, this particular phenomenon tends 
to disappear. 
CONCLUSION 
The central idea is that political apportionment 
must be based on principles of fair division rather than 
on disputes over numbers. This can be achieved. 
Three principles were singled out which are neces- 
sary to the case being studied and sufficient to uniquely 
determine numerical solutions. First, essential to any 
method, is that it be applicable to all possible situations. 
Second, any method - not satisfying quota seems shocking to 
common sense, contrary to any reasonable notion of fair 
division, and risks being unacceptable to an informed 
electorate. Third, the Alabama paradox has already proven 
to be politically unacceptable. In the coming years as 
populations and the number of member nations change, the 
European Parliament will have to reapportion its seats and 
it is likely that its size will rise, not fall. Thus, a 
universally applicable method is necessary which meets the 
most basic measure of fairness, satisfying quota, and which 
is free from the defect of the Alabama paradox. The only 
method which accomplishes this is the Quota Method. 
